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1. Introduction  
The rapid growth of the computers that are interconnected, the crime rate has also increased 
and the ways to mitigate those crimes has become the important problem now. In the entire 
globe, organizations, higher learning institutions and governments are completely 
dependent on the computer networks which plays a major role in their daily operations. 
Hence the necessity for protecting those networked systems has also increased.  Cyber 
crimes like compromised server, phishing and sabotage of privacy information has 
increased in the recent past. It need not be a massive intrusion, instead a single intrusion can 
result in loss of highly privileged and important data. Intusion behaviour can be classified 
based on different attack types. Smart intruders will not attack using a single attack, instead, 
they will perform the attack by combining few different attack types to deceive the detection 
system at the gateway. As a countermeasure, computational intelligence can be applied to 
the intrusion detection systems to realize the attacks, alert the administrator about the form 
and severity, and also to take any predetermined or adaptive measures dissuade the 
intrusion. 
2. Need for hybrid IDS systems 
This section introduces a classification (Debar et al., 1999) of intrusion detection systems that 
highlights the current research status. This classification defines families of intrusion 
detection systems according to their properties. There are four different types (Figure 1) of 
intrusion detection available based on the past (Axelsson, 1998; Richard and Giovanni, 2002) 
and current researches (Scarfone and Peter, 2007; Sabahi and Movaghar, 2008). The 
following paragraphs explain the types in detail. Principally, an IDS is concerned with the 
detection of hostile actions. The intrusion detection approaches can be classified into 
anomaly based and signature based which any network security tools are mostly using 
(Ozgur et al., 2005). One more classification can be made by considering the source of data 
used for intrusion detection. The taxonomy   can be given based on the information derived 
from a single host (named as Host based IDS (HIDS)) and the information derived from 
complete segment of the network that is being monitored (named as Network based IDS 
(NIDS). 
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Any IDS can be categorized upon its operation as standalone or centralized applications that 
create a distributed system. Standalone systems will be working individually without any 
agents but centralized applications work with autonomous agents that are capable of taking 
preemptive and reactive measures. 
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Fig. 1. Classification of intrusion detection systems 
An IDS is categorized as behavior-based system, when it uses information about the normal 
behavior of the system it monitors. Behavior on detection describes the response of the IDS 
after the detection of attacks. It can be divided into active or passive based on the attack 
response. These two types of intrusion detection systems differ significantly from each 
other, but complements one another well. The architecture of host-based is completely 
dependent on agent-based, which means that a software agent resides on each of the hosts, 
and will be governed by the main system. In addition, more efficient host-based intrusion 
detection systems are capable of monitoring and collecting system audit trails in real time as 
well as on a scheduled basis, thus distributing both CPU utilization and network overhead 
and providing for a flexible means of security administration. It would be advantageous in 
IDS implementation to completely integrate the NIDS, su ch that it would filter alerts in a 
identical manner to HIDS and can be controlled from teh same centralized location. In 
conclusion, highly secure environment should require both NIDS and HIDS to be 
implemented for not only providing a complete defence against dynamic attacks but also to 
effectively and effecintly monitor, respond and detected the computer/network misuse 
against threats and malicious activities. 
3. Different aritificial intelligence approaches in HIDS  
Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques play a vital role by reducing the data used for 
detection and also classifying the data according to the needs and it is applied in both 
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techniques (misuse detection and anomaly detection). AI techniques have been used to 
automate the intrusion detection process; which includes neural networks, fuzzy inference 
systems, evolutionary computation, machine learning, support vector machines, etc. The 
following sections will give an overall view (Table 1) about some of the Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) techniques applied for intrusion detection.  
3.1 Artificial neural networks (ANN) 
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) consists of a collection of processing units called as 
neurons, which are highly interconnected. They have the ability to learn-by-example and 
also via generalizing from limited, noisy, and complete data too.  Neural Networks can be 
distinguished into two types based on its architecture (Wu and Banzhaf, 2009): 
1. Supervised training algorithms, where in the learning phase, the network learns the 
desired output for a given input or pattern. The well known architecture of supervised 
neural network is the Multi-Level Perception (MLP).  
2. Unsupervised training algorithms, where in the learning phase, the network learns 
without specifying any desired output. Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) are popular 
among unsupervised training algorithms. A SOM tries to find a topological mapping 
from the input space to clusters.  
Lippman and Cunningham (1999) and Ryan et al., (1998) created keyword count based IDS 
with neural networks. Researchers (Ghosh et al., 1999) created a neural network to analyze 
program behavior profiles instead of user behavior profiles. Cannady (1998), developed a 
network-based neural network detection system in which packet-level network data was 
retrieved from a database and then classified according to nine packet characteristics and 
presented to a neural network. Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) have also been used as 
anomaly intrusion detectors (Girardin and Brodbeck, 1998). SOM was used to cluster and 
then graphically display the network data for the user to determine which clusters 
contained attacks. Applications of ANN in intrusion detection can be found in Cansian et al., 
(1997). However, on contrary to neural networks, self-organizing maps do not provide a 
descriptive model which explains a particular detection decision. 
3.2 Genetic algorithms 
Genetic Algorithm for Simplified Security Audit Trials Analysis (GASSATA) proposed by 
the Me (1998), introduced genetic algorithm for misuse intrusion detection. GASSATA 
constructed a two dimensional matrix. One axis of the matrix specifies different attacks 
already known. The other axis represents different kinds of events derived from audit trails. 
Therefore this matrix actually represents the patterns of intrusions. Given an audit record 
being monitored which includes information about the number of occurrences of every 
event; this method will apply genetic algorithms to find the potential attacks appearing in 
the audit record. However, the assumption that the attacks are dependent only on events in 
this method will restrict its generality. There are two steps involved in genetic algorithm, 
one is coding a solution to the problem with a string of bits, and the other is finding a fitness 
function to test each individual of the population against evaluation criteria. Me (1998) used 
a standard GA, while Dass used a micro-GA in order reduce the time overhead normally 
associated with GA. Diaz-Gomez and Hougen (2005) corrected the fitness definition (Me, 
1998) used after a detailed analysis and mathematical justification (Diaz-Gomez and 
Hougen, 2006). The detection rate can be high and false alarm can be low if the fitness 
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function is well designed. The disadvantage is that it cannot locate the attack in audit trails 
(Zorana et al., 2009) and it cannot detect novel attacks as it requires more domain specific 
knowledge (Li, 2006). Genetic based intrusion detection has no ability to detect multiple 
simultaneous attacks (Suhail et al., 2008) and this detection approach meets computation 
complexity problems. A novel approach proposed by addresses the problem of detecting 
masquerading, a security attack in which an intruder assumes the identity of a legitimate 
user. The approach uses the techniques used in bioinformatics for a pair-wise sequence 
alignments to compare the monitored session with past user behavior. The algorithm uses a 
semi-global alignment and a unique scoring system to measure similarity between a 
sequence of commands produced by a potential intruder and the user signature, which is a 
sequence of commands collected from a legitimate user. Even though a novel method was 
proposed, false positive rate is somewhat a lackluster. 
3.3 Immune system approach 
The Human Immune System (HIS) (Somayaji et al., 1997) protects the body against damage 
from extremely large number of harmful bacteria and viruses, termed pathogens. It does 
this largely without prior knowledge of the structure of these pathogens. This property, 
along with the distributed, self-organized and light weighted nature of the mechanisms by 
which it achieves this protection, has in recent years made it the focus of increased interest 
within the computer science and intrusion detection communities. The AIS described by 
Kephart (1994) is one of the earliest attempts of applying HIS mechanisms to intrusion 
detection. The paper focuses on automatic detection of computer viruses and worms. They 
utilized fuzzy matching techniques based on the existing signatures. Aickelin et al., (2003) 
discussed the application of danger theory to intrusion detection and the possibility of 
combining research from wet and computer labs in a theoretical paper.  Sarafijanovic and 
Boudec (2003) developed an immune based system to detect malfunctioning nodes in a ad-
hoc networks. They use Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol to create a series of data 
sets. A detailed review of the AIS applied to intrusion can be found in (Kim, 2003). 
3.4 Fuzzy logic  
Fuzzy logic starts and builds on a set of user-supplied human language rules. The fuzzy 
systems convert these rules to their mathematical equivalents. This simplifies the job of the 
system designer and the computer, and results in much more accurate representations of the 
way systems behave in the real world. Additional benefits of fuzzy logic include its 
simplicity and its flexibility. Fuzzy logic can handle problems with imprecise and 
incomplete data, and it can model nonlinear functions of arbitrary complexity. Fuzzy logic 
techniques have been employed in the computer security field since the early 90’s (Hosmer, 
1993). Its ability to model complex systems made it a valid alternative, in the computer 
security field, to analyze continuous sources of data and even unknown or imprecise 
processes (Hosmer, 1993). Fuzzy logic has also demonstrated potential in the intrusion 
detection field when compared to systems using strict signature matching or classic pattern 
deviation detection.  Bridges (Bridges and Vaughn, 2000), states the concept of security itself 
is fuzzy. In other words, the concept of fuzziness helps to smooth out the abrupt separation  
of normal behavior from abnormal behavior. That is, a given data point falling 
outside/inside a defined “normal interval”, will be considered anomalous/normal to the 
same degree regardless of its distance from/within the interval.  Fuzzy logic has a capability 
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to represent imprecise forms of reasoning in areas where firm decisions have to be made in 
indefinite environments like intrusion detection. 
The model suggested in (Dokas et al., 2002) building rare class prediction models for 
identifying known intrusions and their variations and anomaly/outlier detection schemes 
for detecting novel attacks whose nature is unknown. The latest in fuzzy is to use the 
Markov model. As suggested in (Xu et al., 2004) a Window Markov model is proposed, the 
next state in the window equal evaluation to be the next state of time t, so they create Fuzzy 
window Markov model. As discussed, researchers propose a technique to generate fuzzy 
classifiers using genetic algorithms that can detect anomalies and some specific intrusions. 
The main idea is to evolve two rules, one for the normal class and other for the abnormal 
class using a profile data set with information related to the computer network during the 
normal behavior and during intrusive (abnormal) behavior. 
3.5 Integrating fuzzy logic with datamining 
Data mining techniques have been commonly used to extract patterns from sets of data. 
Although association rules can be mined from audit data for anomaly detection, the mined 
rules are at the data level. Many quantitative features are involved in intrusion detection. As 
per previous researches (Lunt et al., 1992; Varun et al., 2009) IDES classifies the statistical 
measures into four types: ordinal measures, categorical measures, binary categorical 
measures and linear categorical measures. Both ordinal measures and linear categorical 
measures are quantitative. SRIs EMERALD (Lunt et al., 1989) also divides the network traffic 
statistical measures into four classes: categorical measures, continuous measures, intensity 
measures and event distribution measures. Example for continuous measures is the 
connection duration and intensity measure is the number of packets during a unit of time. 
The fuzzy sets provide a smooth transition between member and non-member of a set; 
therefore, there are fewer boundary elements being excluded. An alternative solution using 
fuzzy sets, introduced by Kuok (Kuok et al., 2001) to categorize quantitative variables, 
offered smooth transitions from one fuzzy set to another. Classification has been repeatedly 
applied to the problem of intrusion detection either to classify events into separate attack 
categories (e.g., the 1999 KDD Cup Competition) or to characterize normal use of a network 
service.  
In our research work, the greatest need was to reduce the amount of data needed for 
processing and the false alarm rate. We are primarily seeking to improve the performance of 
an existing system rather than trying to replace current intrusion detection methods with a 
data mining approach. While current signature-based intrusion detection methods have 
limitations as stated in the previous section, they do still provide important services and this 
required us to determine how data mining could be used in a complementary way to 
existing measures and improves it. 
4. Different hybrid IDS 
To the best of our knowledge there are few research work and papers that have been 
published in the area of Network Security, particularly in the area of hybrid intrusion 
detection. But the work of integrating misuse and anomaly detection is very rare. Based on 
the objective set for our research, Table 1 summarizes the closely related work, with the 
method used and the findings by the respective researchers for each research work selected. 
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
140 
Researcher and 
Model 
Method Findings 
Lee et al., 2001 
IIDS  
Classification 
based anomaly 
detection 
It uses inductive rule generation to 
generate rules for important, yet 
infrequent events 
Dickerson and 
Dickerson  (2000) 
FIRE   
Classification 
based anomaly 
detection 
It generates fuzzy sets for every 
observed feature which are in turn used 
to define fuzzy rules to detect individual 
attacks 
Barbara et al., 2001 
ADAM   
Association rules 
and classification 
based anomaly 
detection 
It performs anomaly detection to filter 
out most of the normal traffic, then it 
uses a classification technique to 
determine the exact nature of the 
remaining activity 
Zhang and 
Zulkernine (2006) 
 
- The outlier detection provided by the 
random forests algorithm is utilized to 
detect unknown intrusions 
Tajbakhsh et al., 
2006;  
Tajbakhsh, et al., 
2009 
Association based 
classification 
The proposed method has proved the 
ability to handle more categorical 
attributes and the efficiency to classify 
large data sets especially for IDS. 
Kai et al., 2007 
HIDS 
Association rules This hybrid system combines the 
advantages of low false-positive rate of 
signature-based intrusion detection 
system (IDS) and the ability of anomaly 
detection system (ADS) to detect novel 
unknown attacks. 
Jianhui et al., 2008 Prefix tree rule 
mining 
Authors proposed a new rule mining 
algorithm base prefix tree (PTBA), which 
compress the fuzzy pattern candidate set 
and frequent set through constructing a 
tree structure, thus it can save the 
memory cost of fuzzy pattern candidate 
and frequent set. 
Table 1. Different hybrid IDS 
Lee et al. (2001) used a classification algorithm called RIPPER to update the rules used by 
Network Flight Recorder (NFR), a commercial real-time network-monitoring tool. 
Manganaris et al., (2000) used association rules from Intelligent Miner to reduce false alarms 
generated by NetRanger’s sensors. MITRE used HOMER (Heuristic for Obvious Mapping 
Episode Recognition) and BART (Back End Analysis and Review if Tagging) along with 
clustering analysis for detection. (Lee et al., 1999) proposed an association rule-based data 
mining approach for anomaly detection where raw data was converted into ASCII network 
packet information, which in turn was converted into connection-level information. These 
connection level records contained connection features like service, duration, etc. 
Association rules were then applied to this data to create models to detect intrusions. They 
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utilized Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) to extract the audit data, which is 
used to build the models, and also to push the signatrues for “novel“ attacks ensuring the 
faster response time for attack detection. 
The primary advantage of CIDF is, it is capable of including heterogeneous intrusion 
detection and response components to share the information and resources in a distributed 
environments for faster attack detection. The method proposed by Lee et al., (2001) extracts 
fuzzy classification rules from numerical data, applying a heuristic learning procedure. The 
learning procedure initially classifies the input space into non-overlapping activation 
rectangles corresponding to different output intervals. In this sense, our work is similar to 
that of (Lee et al., 2001; Manganaris et al., 2000 and MITRE).There are no overlapping and 
inhibition areas. However, the disadvantage listed is, the high false positive rates which is 
the primary scaling of all the IDS. 
Researchers (Dickerson and Dickerson, 2000) developed the Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition 
Engine (FIRE) (Figure 2) using fuzzy sets and fuzzy rules. FIRE produces fuzzy sets based 
on a simple data mining technique by processing the network input data. Then the fuzzy 
rules are defined by the fuzzy sets to detect attacks. FIRE relies on attack specific as they do 
not establish any model that represents the current state of the system. On the other hand, 
FIRE detection is based on the fuzzy logic rules that was created, and applies it to the testing 
audit data for attack classifications. The authors recorded port scan and probes attacks can 
be detected highly by using this method. But, the primary disadvantage as noted by authors 
is the labor intensive rule generation process. 
In another work, (Barbará et al., 2001) describes Audit Data Analysis and Mining (ADAM) 
(Figure 3), a real-time anomaly detection system that uses a module to classify the 
suspicious events into false alarms or real attacks. Customized profiles were built using data 
mining techniques, and then the classification of observed events are classified into either as 
attacks or as false alarms. ADAM uses a method that combined association rules along with 
mining and classification techniques. ADAM builds a “normal” database consists of 
frequent itemsets by using data that is attack free during the training phase. 
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Fig. 2. Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) (Dickerson and Dickerson, 2000) 
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During the testing (or detection) phase it runs a sliding windoe algorithm to find the 
frequent itemsets in the last few connections and then compares with the normal item set 
repository which has already been created. With the remaining item sets which have been 
flagged as suspicious, ADAM uses a classifier that was trained to classify the known attacks, 
unknown or a false alarm. Association rules play a major role in gathering necessary data 
(knowledge) about the nature of audit data.  The major drawback is that new type attacks 
rules need to be given by the external security officer i.e. it does not automate rule 
generation process and more number of components prevents it from working fast. 
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Fig. 3. Training and discovery phases of ADAM (Barbará et al., 2001) 
Zhang and Zulkernine (2006) detects known intrusions were detected by signature detection 
module by implementing Random forest algorithm (Breiman, 2001).   In the following step, 
the outlier detection that was produced by random forests algorithm was utilized to detect 
new or unknown intrusion attempts.  Approaches that use both signature detection and 
anomaly detection produces two set of reports recording the intrusive activities provided 
they have a correlation component which will analyze and produce perfect results.  
Researchers (Tajbakhsh et al., 2006; Tajbakhsh et al., 2009) use association based classification 
methods (Figure 5) to classify normal and abnormal attacks based on the compatibility 
threshold. The proposed system consists of training phase and detection phase. In training 
phase authors use FCM clustering algorithm to define fuzzy membership functions and use 
hyper edge concept for item / feature reduction. Once rules are defined, then the knowledge 
base is used in the training phase to match and alert for testing data. FCM an extension of K-
means suffer from a basic limitation, i.e. using pair wise similarity between objects and 
cluster centroids for membership assignment, thereby lacking the ability to capture 
nonlinear relationships. Since this limitation is not considered by the researchers, there by 
limiting the system itself in capturing slightly deviated attacks. Next, the system was tested 
with only 10% of corrected data set from DARPA, which is considered not effective  because 
it is observed (Su-Yun and Ester, 2008) that there is a difference in detection rate and false 
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positive rates, compared to testing with complete data set and sampling 10% of test data. 
Also not to forget, that most of the researchers are benchmarked after testing the whole data 
set and moreover the authors have note mentioned what testing data they used as there are 
about few weeks of available test data. 
 
 
Sensors
Online Pre-
processors
Misuse 
Detector
Misuse 
Alarm
Offline pre-
processor
Intrusion 
Pattern 
builder
Data Set
Network
Detection 
Database
Training 
Database
Anamoly 
Database
Service 
pattern builder
Outlier 
detector
Anomaly 
alarmer
P
a
cke
ts
Audited 
data
Feature 
vectors
Attacks
Intrusion 
patterns
Feature 
vectors
Training 
data
Service 
patterns
Unknown 
attacks
Alarms
N
e
w
 
in
tr
u
si
o
n
s
Uncertain 
items
Misuse detection
Anomaly 
detection
Alarms
Online
Offline
 
Fig. 4. Misuse and anomaly detection components (Zhang and Zulkernine, 2006) 
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The research work (Kai et al., 2007) paper reports the design principles and evaluation 
results of a new experimental Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). This hybrid 
system combines the advantages of low false-positive rate of signature-based intrusion 
detection system (IDS) and the ability of Anomaly Detection System (ADS) to detect novel 
unknown attacks. By mining anomalous traffic episodes from Internet connections, the 
authors build an ADS that detects anomalies beyond the capabilities of signature-based 
systems. A weighted signature generation scheme is developed to integrate ADS with 
SNORT by extracting signatures from anomalies detected. HIDS extracts signatures from the 
output of ADS and adds them into the SNORT signature database for fast and accurate 
intrusion detection. The test results of HIDS scheme over real-life Internet trace data mixed 
with 10 days of Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) attack 
data set (Lippmann et al., 2000), the  experimental results showed a 60 percent detection rate 
of the HIDS, compared with 30 percent and 22 percent in using the SNORT and Bro systems, 
respectively. This sharp increase in detection rate is obtained with less than 3 percent false 
alarms. The signatures generated by ADS upgrade the SNORT performance by 33 percent. 
The HIDS approach proves the vitality of detecting intrusions and anomalies, 
simultaneously, by automated data mining and signature generation over Internet 
connection episodes. But, this system is lacking in a major aspect of detection rate, as stated 
earlier detection rate should be high (some what near to 90%), according to the HIDS, if 
more than 30% of the attacks are left unnoticed, then the purpose of IDS is getting defeated 
making it easier for intruders to take control over the protecting networks. 
In this research (Jianhui et al., 2008), an intrusion detection model base on fuzzy sets is 
presented to avoid the sharp boundary problem in rules mining. Considering Apriori 
algorithm is time-consuming as well as space-consuming; moreover, we propose a new rule 
mining algorithm base prefix tree (PTBA). PTBA algorithm (Borgelt, 2005) compress the 
fuzzy pattern candidate set and frequent set through constructing a tree structure, thus it 
can save the memory cost of fuzzy pattern candidate and frequent set. This characteristic 
provides a better mining tragedy: if the support degree of a certain node is smaller than the 
threshold value of support (minsup), the pattern of this node is non-frequent, and then the 
whole sub-trees whose root node is this node are non-frequent. This characteristic avoids 
combination explosion and improve mining efficiency prominently. Experiments prove that 
capability and efficiency of IDS model is obviously improved but, the authors have not 
addressed the weight supplied on each tree, if the tree goes further down and moreover false 
positive rate was not recorded and the test data was 10% sampled data of DARPA data set. 
5. Proposed hybrid IDS 
Our aim is to design and develop an Hybrid Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) that would 
be more accurate, low in false alarms, Intelligent by using fuzzy mechanisms, not easily 
deceived by small variations, capable of sniffing and detecting real time packets. The data 
processor and classifier component summarizes and tabulates the data into carefully 
selected categories because the amount of data and meta-data associated with network 
traffic is large. Prior to data analysis, attributes representing relevant features of the input 
packets must be established. Once the attributes of relevance have been defined, data 
processor and classifier is employed to compute control variables. Data processor is 
responsible for accepting raw packet data and produce records for each group as specified 
by the control variables. 
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Fig. 6. Overall view of proposed Hybrid IDS 
Data mining algorithm by Kuok et al., (1999) is modified and implemented (Shanmugm and 
Idris 2009)to produce a set of association rules. These rules are expressed as a logic 
implication with antecedent and consequence. The systems work in two different modes, 
first being the learning mode and the second being the detection mode. Prior to any data 
analysis, attributes representing relevant features of the input data (packets) must be 
established for any IDS. In complex domains like security, attribute selection may play a 
crucial role. Attributes are represented by names that will be used as linguistic variables by 
the Data Miner and the Fuzzy Inference Engine and is implemented using the attribute 
selection algorithm as explained as folows: 
Step 1. Initialize the queue S with example set values and the attribute set values. 
Step 2. The following steps from 3 until step 7 is performed while CARD(R) is less than the 
maxsize  provided or if the size of the stack is not null. 
Step 3. Create a set value which consists of the queue value with maximum support and  is 
a subset of the queue value. 
Step 4. Information gain is computed using the formula.   
Step 5. Select the attributes with maximum info gain values 
Step 6. If the attribute value does not belong to the subset R then 
Step 6a. The subset R is the common values of R along with the attributes 
Step 7. Following steps are performed for every tk with  their terms of attributes 
Step 7a.Example set of terms forms a set based on the examples or the attribute values 
equals that tk. 
Decision trees are powerful tools in classification and prediction of larger dataset. The 
attractiveness lies in the formation of rules that is easier for human understanding and the 
direct usage of those rules with the existing database tools.  In majority of the applications 
especially security, the accuracy of the data classification plays a vital role. In order to define 
information gain precisely, we need to define a measure commonly used in information 
theory, called entropy, that characterizes the (im)purity of an arbitrary collection of 
examples. Given a set S, containing only positive and negative samples with their 
corresponding labels.  The expected information need to classify the DARPA sample is 
calculated by : 
I(Sc) = ∑
=
−
c
i 1
pi log2 pi 
Where  s = total number of samples 
c = total classes 
pi = si / s 
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For our experiments a feature F with values (f1,f2,….fw) are divided into w training sub sets 
(s1,s2,....sw) where Sj is the subset which holds the value fj for F. Entropy of the selected 
feature is 
E(F) = ).....(*
1
....1
cjj
c
j
cjj
ssiI
s
ss∑
=
++
 
More precisely, the information gain, Gain (F) of an attribute A, relative to a collection of 
examples S, is defined as  
Gain (F) = I(s1,s2,….sc) – E(F)       
Table 2 shows the information gain calculated for all the attributes based on the equation 
explained above. 
 
Rank Information Gain Feature Rank Information Gain Feature 
 1 0.988292114 E 13 0.673576388 V 
2 0.985914569 C 14 0.671545707 AM 
3 0.970739369 J 15 0.662169667 AN 
4 0.895566287 AH 16 0.637824522 AO 
5 0.844695164 AJ 17 0.591035993 W 
6 0.826015494 F 18 0.543491709 AA 
7 0.774897786 AI 19 0.516671516 AC 
8 0.767343313 AG 20 0.476343726 AF 
9 0.767053827 AK 21 0.439147285 L 
10 0.724208609 M 22 0.427774836 X 
11 0.703067734 A 23 0.391083691 K 
12 0.692155232 B 24 0.359009856 D 
Table 2. Information gain for DARPA features 
6. Implementation results and discussion 
To implement and prove the proposed method we used Java 2.0 programming language as 
our support and implementation tool for IDS. Any research work should be verified with 
some form of experiment using data. Specifically in the field of Intrusion Detection, testing 
plays a vital role. To fulfill the above requirements and also to obtain proof of our concept, 
we tested our system with two sets of data first with DARPA dataset and second, with 
online data captured inside UTM Citycampus. 
Until the year 1998 intrusion detection research has lacked a corpus of data that could serve 
as the basis for system development, improvement and evaluation. To meet that need, 
DARPA developed a corpus of data for the DARPA 1998 off-line intrusion detection 
evaluation, using a network and scripted actors to loosely model the network traffic 
measured between a US Air Force base and the internet. The latest dataset was added with 
few more attacks that reflect more real-time data. More details about the 1999 DARPA 
evaluation data set can be found in Appendix A. For experimental purpose a subset of 1999 
DARPA data was used to test the prototype system. A quick glance at the 1999 DARPA 
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dataset, shows it contains 3 weeks of training data and two weeks of testing data.  First and 
third week data do not contain any attack and this was used as training data for anomaly 
intrusion detection. Second week contains all types of attacks so this was used for creating 
attack profiles. We used two weeks of test data for our testing. The prototype was 
developed using Java programming language. The developed prototype was tested in 
Pentium 4 2.40 GHz machine with 1 GB RAM. Both testing and real-time data capturing 
were carried out in the same platform. 
The primary aim in our work is to find the relevant attributes with maximum information 
gain. Table 3 shows the different set of attributes considered for difference classes of attacks 
ranked accordingly by information gain algorithm. The first attribute found by the attribute 
selection algorithm, as expected, was ICMP with 0.836 information gain. This is the value 
with maximum information gain. As a result, the root node of the decision tree is associated 
with this attribute i.e. root node will carry ICMP.   
 
Types Ranking of Features 
NORMAL AH,E,J,AJ,C,F,A,W,B,M,AC,AK,AF,AG,AI,AN,AA,AM,MO 
DOS AH,E,J,C,AI,AJ 
PROBE E,C,AJ,J,F,AH,B,AG,AI,AK,V,AM,AO,M,AC,AN,AK,W,AF,AA,G,H,L,P,X,
AD,AE 
U2R C,J,E,AJ,AM,M,F,AH,AG,AF,AC,AN,AA,V,A,W,L,D 
R2L E,C,J,AH,AJ,AI,AG,AK,F,A,L,M,V,AA,AO,X,AC,AN,W,AM,AF,D,AE 
ALL E,C,J,AH,AJ,F,AI,AG,AK,M,A,B,V,AM,AN,AO,W,AA,AC,AE,AF,L,X,K,D 
Table 3. Ranking of attributes for four classes of attacks 
The majority of the positive and negative examples will be obviously associated with the 
ABOVE branch rather than the AVERAGE and BELOW branches. The examples associated 
with ABOVE were then used for the second iteration, selecting TCP as the most relevant 
attribute with an information gain of 0.064 and the majority of the training examples in the 
AVERAGE branch. The third and final iteration selected the FIN attribute with an 
information gain of 0.00056.  This attribute represents tcp packets with the fin flag set. In 
other words, the attributes ICMP, TCP and FIN are most relevant in this case and are 
selected to describe the input data in the data mining algorithm.  
The aim of this test is to find out the attack type “smurf”. This attack is new to 1999 DARPA 
data set. The following table describes the attack signature and the description of “smurf” 
 
Attack Description Signature 
Smurf In the smurf attack, attackers use 
ICMP echo request packets directed 
to IP broadcast addresses from 
remote locations to create a denial-
of-service attack 
There is a large number of 'echo 
replies' being sent to a particular 
victim machine from many different 
places, but no 'echo requests' 
originating from the victim machine. 
Table 4. Attack description and signature for smurf 
This type of attack detection also required the counter to reach a larger percentage. Hence 
the threshold was set at 0.6 i.e. the rule must have a firing strength below 0.6 to increase the 
graph value. Figure 6 shows the firing strength of the rules against the testing data. For the 
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records from 300 to 500, the firing strength fell to zero and suddenly it shot up to 1 i.e. an 
increase by 100%. So this sudden rise indicated an attack. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Consolidated firing strength for rules to detect smurf attack 
 
 
Fig. 8. Consolidated firing strength for real time data 
To prove that the system can also work online, the prototype was tested with online data 
captured in UTM Citycampus. As networking packets constituted huge amount of data, we 
will however discuss only a small amount of the test data. Here the anomaly detection 
profiles were based on the DARPA data set. It constituted a clear data i.e. data without any 
attacks. The data was captured using our own sniffing tool which was written using the Java 
language. The packages for packet capturing were widely available on the Internet. The data 
was collected on different days and at different time as follows. 
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Day 1 : Feb 20th starting from 10.00 a.m. to 6 p.m. 
Day 2 : Feb 22nd starting from 10.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. 
The amount of data collected on the above mentioned days was about 1.76 GB. The collected 
data was processed and tested with the IIDS. The following graph represents the testing for 
20 minutes on day 2 i.e. from 11.30 a.m. to 11.50 a.m. 
In the above figure, the firing strengths for most of the records were near to 1. So, there was 
not much change, which indicated that the prototype did not detect any attack during the 
testing period. The consolidated results for all four attack types are shown in Table 6.12. The 
overall analysis and benchmarking of our prototype against others is as shown in Table 6.14. 
The performance table shows that the detection rate is comparatively higher than all other 
systems. The false positive rate is also low in comparison to the values obtained from other 
models. 
It was interesting to note that during the experimental stage U2R attacks performance was 
relatively less, this was because the attacks were distributed across the entire test data. More 
interesting and important was the fact that the prototype was able to detect the “yaga” 
attack which occurred during Week 5 day 5. This attack was new and moreover it was not 
available in the training data set. The proposed prototype was able to detect another new 
attack, “sechole” which occurred during week 4 day 2. In most cases U2R attack detection 
performance was always low because of its distribution of attacks and also  multiple 
connections are involved which need more features to be selected. 
 
Attack Types  Detection % False positive % 
R2L 92.1 10.7 
PROBE 98.4 1.8 
DOS 94.77 5.5 
U2R 69.6 6.7 
Average 88.71 6.1 
Table 5. Consolidated result for all the four attack types 
The R2L attack performance was satisfactory because the prototype was able to detect most 
of the attacks with high detection rate and with low false positives. The system was able to 
detect new attacks like net cat, net bus and ncftp, which do not occur in the training data. 
The total false positive rate seems to be larger but since it has more number of attack 
instances the value also had increased simultaneously. In the future, we will try to bring 
down the false positives rate by at least to 0.5%.  
During the research, the IIDS were able to detect arppoison, a new type of attack with a high 
detection rate nearing 95% and with a low false positive < 1%. We were able to achieve 100% 
detection rate for smurf attacks.  These performance shows (Table 6.14) that our system is 
better in detecting certain types of attacks fully. Some of the researchers mentioned in our 
earlier chapters use only 10% of the KDD training data. Using such a small amount of 
training dataset is questionable because the dataset is idealistically simple and moreover 
98% of the training data contains “smurf” and “neptune” class. However, for content based 
attacks which is based on the payload, depending on a feature that is irrelevant with content 
may lead to false positives. 
In a more recent work (Su et al., 2009) have applied fuzzy-association rules using 
incremental mining. The major advantages cited by the authors are the ability of the system 
www.intechopen.com
 Intrusion Detection Systems 
 
150 
to create a learning data set based on the real time data and to handle real time network 
traffic. Even though it has the ability to handle real time systems, the research has not 
addressed the query frequencies as apriori algorithm will generate huge number of 
candidates. Using incremental data mining will also lead to increase in the number of 
queries to the rule databases since the rules are checked every two minutes, which could be 
a bottle neck especially when the system goes online. However, another limitation (Su et al 
2009) did not mention is the storage requirements for the huge amount of rules produced by 
the aprirori algorithm based on the online traffic. This limitation was well handled in 
(Shanmugam and Idris 2009) and has solved the storage and query frequencies. This was 
however acknowledged by (Hossain Mahmood et al., 2003) who concluded that the 
incremental mining approach has some advantages, but the application to intrusion 
detection need to be explored further as it depends on the various aspects like algorithm 
selected, training and testing data used etc. 
We were not able to produce the detection rate, false positives or any other values for real-
time data because there is no any universal benchmarking methods available. 
Our experimental results are summarized in the below table (Table 6.14) for different 
attributes. We selected the features by calculating the detection rate for each feature and 
deleting it one by one. We have not discussed the values due to space restrictions. By the 
above method we were able to select the appropriate features using the information gain 
algorithm. Table 8  gives the comparison of using all 41 features against selected 24 features 
by our proposed method. This clearly reveals the fact that all the features are not important 
and the selected features had played an important role in improving the overall 
performance. Initial FIRE (Dickerson and Dickerson, 2000) tests were performed on 
production local area networks in the College of Engineering at Iowa State University. Using 
the fuzzy rules, FIRE able to detect nine distinct TCP port scans and separate ICMP (ping) 
scans of hosts on the network potentially malicious attackers from outside the local network 
domain. Additionally, it was able to detect non-malicious port scans launched against the 
system from the local domain. The system also triggered HIGH alerts when seldom seen 
types of network traffic were observed, in agreement with the Fuzzy Rules used. The system 
reported a high false positive rate (10.6%) with an average detection rate (79.2%). ADAM 
(Barbara et al 2001) was aimed to detect intrusions of the type Denial of Service (DOS) and 
Probe attacks (although ADAM can discover other types of intrusions as well). 
The overall detection rate recorded was about 84% with a very high false positive rate of 
14%.ADAM is a test bed to research which data mining techniques are appropriate for 
intrusion detection. In spite of the furious activity in intrusion detection, the problem of 
false alarms and missed attacks (false positives and negatives) is still prevalent. 
 
Features Detection % FP % 
All features (41) 77.21 9.23 
Selected features (24) 88.71 6.1 
Table 6. Different feature selection 
The experimental results (Thombini et al 2004) shows that the approach drastically reduces 
the amount of false positives and unqualified events. The proposed model clearly addresses 
the problem of false positives and the anomaly and signature can be updated as and when 
needed.  The system was tested against HTTP traffic for its effectiveness and the comparison 
was made against capture traffic on their own and not on DARPA dataset. The proposed 
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hybrid system (Zhang and Zulkernine (2006)) combines the advantages of these two 
detection approaches. Besides, the misuse detection can remove known intrusions from 
datasets, so the performance of the anomaly detection can be improved by applying the 
misuse detection first. The experimental results (Detection rate of about 86%) show that the 
proposed hybrid approach can achieve high detection rate with low false positive rate, and 
can detect novel intrusions. However, some intrusions that are very similar with each other 
cannot be detected by the anomaly detection. That is a limitation of the outlier detection 
provided by the random forests algorithm. 
By combining the anomaly detection method (Tajbakhsh, A., et al. 2006; Tajbakhsh, et al,. 
2009) with misuse detection method,  the false positive error rate in the proposed anomaly 
detection method is kept as low as in misuse detection scenario. There is a remarkable 
decrease in the detection rate of the known attacks in the anomaly detection scenario. And 
in the case of unseen attacks the anomaly scenario performs better than the misuse 
approach. This is actually the most important advantage of combining both the methods. 
This method is somewhat near to IIDS detection rate and false positive rate. In the weighted 
signature generation approach (Kai et al., 2007), only the most frequent patterns of detected 
anomalies are characterized as signatures. By further eliminating nondiscriminative 
patterns, the generated signatures are quite specific to anomalies detected. Therefore, the 
newly generated signatures have quite low false alarm rates. The proposed HIDS results in a 
detection rate of 60 percent, and False alarm rates are maintained about 3 percent. Alerts 
from intrusions and anomalies detected need to be correlated to result in an even smaller 
overhead in the detection process. 
 
Group Name  Detection rate % False positive % 
Lee et al., 2001 
IIDS  
78 12.2 
Dickerson and 
Dickerson  (2000) 
FIRE  ** 
79.2 10.6 
Barbara et al., 2001 
ADAM   
84 14 
Zhang and Zulkernine 
(2006) 
86 NA 
Tajbakhsh et al., 2006; 
Tajbakhsh et al., 2009 
85.5 6.9 
Kai et al., 2007 
HIDS 
60 30 
Jianhui et al., 2008 94 NA 
IIDS 88.71 6.1 
Table 7. Comparison with other selected models 
In this work (Jianhui et al., 2008), the model of intrusion detection based on fuzzy sets is 
suggested and experiment results showed its accuracy and capability. In the process of rules 
mining, however, we found the select of membership function depended excessively upon 
the expert knowledge, which necessarily causes the deviation between results and 
experiment conclusion. The authors need to focus on how to obtain an optimal membership 
function with minimum overhead. In the experiment (Gongxing and Yimin, 2009), authors 
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collect the audit data of users' 7 day's normal operations as training data so as to get the 
user's behaviors. In this system, misuse detection can detect the attack attempt well, but due 
to no intrusion rule of impersonation attack and legal user attack in the misuse detection 
rule base, the two attacks can not be detected. Combined with the characteristics of misuse 
detection and anomaly detection, designs and realizes a new type of intrusion detection 
system with adaptive ability and applies the Apriori algorithm based on Trie tree to the 
database intrusion detection system to improve the generation efficiency of rule base. 
7. Conclusions and future directions 
In the recent years, IDS have slowly changed from host based application to a distributed 
systems that involves a variety of operating systems. The challenges that lie ahead of us for 
intrusion detection system, particularly for hybrid systems are huge. First, is the inability to 
reduce the number of false positives that prevents from intrusion detection systems being 
deployed widespread. As reported (Varun, 2009), the intrusion detection systems crash 
because of its in-ability to withstand the heavy load of false alarms.  Second, the time take to 
process the huge amount of data is mounting, a process to reduce the time taken should be 
considered. Third, there is a lack of standard evaluation dataset that can simulate the real 
time network environments. The existing evaluation data set DARPA/Lincoln labs are a 
decade old and they are currently being used to evaluate any intrusion detection systems. 
There is a need to create a new data set, where it could be used to evaluate the intrusion 
detection systems for the dynamic topologies. Finally, our system crashed, as it could not 
withstand the traffic for more than three weeks without restarting, and that issue has to be 
sorted out using a high-end hardware and systematically re-tuned source code.  
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